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Abstract—Adversarial audio attacks can be considered as a
small perturbation unperceptive to human ears that is intention-
ally added to an audio signal and causes a machine learning
model to make mistakes. This poses a security concern about the
safety of machine learning models since the adversarial attacks
can fool such models toward the wrong predictions. In this paper
we first review some strong adversarial attacks that may affect
both audio signals and their 2D representations and evaluate the
resiliency of deep learning models and support vector machines
(SVM) trained on 2D audio representations such as short time
Fourier transform, discrete wavelet transform (DWT) and cross
recurrent plot against several state-of-the-art adversarial attacks.
Next, we propose a novel approach based on pre-processed
DWT representation of audio signals and SVM to secure audio
systems against adversarial attacks. The proposed architecture
has several preprocessing modules for generating and enhancing
spectrograms including dimension reduction and smoothing. We
extract features from small patches of the spectrograms using
the speeded up robust feature (SURF) algorithm which are
further used to transform into cluster distance distribution using
the K-Means++ algorithm. Finally, SURF-generated vectors are
encoded by this codebook and the resulting codewords are used
for training a SVM. All these steps yield to a novel approach
for audio classification that provides a good tradeoff between
accuracy and resilience. Experimental results on three environ-
mental sound datasets show the competitive performance of the
proposed approach compared to the deep neural networks both
in terms of accuracy and robustness against strong adversarial
attacks.
Index Terms—Spectrograms, Environmental Sound Classifica-
tion, Adversarial Attack, K-Means++, Support Vector Machines
(SVM), Convolutional Denoising Autoencoder.
I. INTRODUCTION
ADVERSARIAL attacks pose security issues since theycan be unrecognizable to human eyes or human ears
while they can easily fool any trained machine learning model
with very high confidence. As these machine learning models
are becoming more present in many devices and applications,
there exists an urgent need for improving their robustness
against adversarial attacks. Basically, an adversarial attack
algorithm formulates an optimization problem such as finding
the smallest possible perturbation to be added to a given
legitimate input (image, audio, spectrogram, etc.) aiming at
a machine learning model to predict a wrong label. This
perturbation should be as small as possible to be imperceptible
to human visual or auditory system. Adversarial attacks have
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been attracting the attention of many researchers, mainly in
the domain of computer vision [1]–[3]. However, adversarial
attacks may also pose a serious threat to voice assistant
devices, speech and speaker recognition as well as other
audio-related applications. In spite of that, few studies have
addressed adversarial attacks for audio signals [4]. One of the
possible reasons is the considerable optimization overhead of
adversarial algorithms when applied to audio signals due to
their high dimensionality. In the big picture, adversarial exam-
ples of audio signals can be crafted during sound production
or post production by changing their amplitude or frequency
into the ranges where humans cannot perceive. This is difficult
and needs to be treated carefully because there is no guarantee
of producing a true adversarial example and the output could
be just a noisy example. In the case of post-production
of adversarial examples, the adversary can either solve an
optimization problem (costly) or develop an adversarial filter
in order to apply some perturbations to a legitimate audio
before passing it through a machine learning model. In both
cases, the victim model could be fooled toward the bad wishes
of the adversary and make the system misbehave.
In this paper, we investigate the threat of adversarial attacks
on environmental audio sounds due to the diversity that we
may find, ranging from baby crying to engines, horns to dog
barking or people chatting with numerical text-free labels.
Adversarial attacks are quite useful for other relevant domains
of speech recognition and music classification and they may be
generalizable to speech-to-text applications, though the latter is
not discussed in this paper. Environmental sound classification
has been a challenging problem in machine learning research
[5]. Both shallow and deep neural networks (DNNs) have
shown competitive performances on benchmarking datasets
such as ESC-10 [6], ESC-50 [6], and UrbanSound8K [7].
Besides the supervised models, there are some unsupervised
models such as spherical K-means for sound representation
learning [5], [8]. Both supervised and unsupervised models
have mainly been trained either on audio waveforms (1D) or
on 2D representation such as spectrograms. In both cases,
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have shown better
performances compared to other classifiers. For instance, the
CNN proposed by Salamon and Bello [9] outperforms their
prior approach based on unsupervised feature learning and ran-
dom forest [5] on the UrbanSound8K dataset. Also, for ESC-
10 and ESC-50 datasets, a 1D CNN with eight convolution
layers (SoundNet) [10] outperforms random forest [6], SVM
using Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) [6], and
convolutional autoencoders [10]. In addition to these CNNs,
other DNN architectures such as AlexNet and GoogLeNet,
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which have shown remarkable performances on image clas-
sification tasks (e.g. ImageNet dataset) have also been used
for environmental sound classification. Interestingly, these two
CNNs trained on spectrograms have been achieving the highest
recognition performance for the three aforementioned datasets
as reported by Boddapati et al. [11].
One of the open problems in audio classification seemingly
is no longer improving recognition accuracy but improving
their strengths against some carefully crafted adversarial ex-
amples. Therefore, the proposed approach for environmental
sound classification is based on two findings: (i) deep learn-
ing models, particularly AlexNet and GoogLeNet outperform
conventional classifiers trained on handcrafted features such as
SVM; (ii) SVM in general is more robust against adversarial
attacks, potentially because it learns from low-dimensional
feature vectors that might reduce the chance of being affected
by adversarial perturbations compared to deep models which
learn from raw data. Following these facts, in this paper we
propose an SVM-based approach that provides a good tradeoff
between the recognition accuracy and the robustness against
adversarial attacks while achieving recognition accuracy com-
parable to deep models. Since there is no standard metric for
evaluating the quality of such a tradeoff, we also introduce a
distance metric based on the error rate versus the fooling rate.
Our contribution in this paper is threefold: (i) we present
common adversarial attacks for audio and we show how they
can affect the security of audio applications; (ii) we charac-
terize the vulnerability of state-of-the-art models based on 2D
representations to adversarial attacks and the transferability
of these attacks between different models; (iii) we propose
a novel approach for environmental sound classification that,
in addition to being robust against several adversarial attacks
without incorporating any reactive or proactive defense pro-
cess, it also provides a high recognition accuracy, which is
competitive with the state-of-the-art.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces
general adversarial attacks and describe the most important
ones. In this section we also present the adversarial attacks
that may affect audio applications based on 2D audio repre-
sentations and discuss adversarial attacks that may affect audio
waveforms. Section III presents the main 2D representations
for audio signals. Section IV presents the proposed approach
that aims of achieving both good classification accuracy and
robustness to adversarial attacks. In Section V we character-
ize the vulnerability of some state-of-the-art models in the
problem of environmental sound classification, measure the
resiliency of the proposed approach versus CNNs and review
the adversarial example transferability among these models.
The conclusions and perspectives of future work are presented
in the last section.
II. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
Adversarial attacks can be considered as carefully crafted
perturbations that when intentionally added to a legitimate
example, lead machine learning models to misbehave [12].
Considering x as a legitimate example, then an adversarial
example x′ can be crafted in such a way that:
x ≈ x′, f∗(x) 6= f∗(x′) (1)
where f∗ is the post-activation function. Supposing that x
represents an image or an audio signal, the differences between
x and x′ should not be perceived by the human visual or
auditory systems.
There are several algorithms for generating x′, mainly when
x is an image. The adversarial attacks can be categorized into
different groups. For instance, if the adversary has access to
the model architecture, parameters, training dataset, etc., it is
categorized as a white-box attack, otherwise it is called black-
box. Also, adversarial attacks can have other taxonomy such as
targeted, where the adversarial perturbation is crafted having
in mind a specific target label, and non-targeted, where the
adversarial perturbation is crafted to induce a machine learning
model to predict any incorrect label. Due to the importance of
studying adversarial threats for data-driven machine learning
models, many attack algorithms have been proposed and they
have shown a great success in fooling advanced models.
However, the main challenge of almost all attack algorithms
is their computational complexity, which makes adversarial
training very time-consuming.
One of the first proposed attacks is the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [13], which still remains one of the most
effective attacks. FGSM was originally built to attack CNNs
but it can also be a serious threat for non-deep architectures.
FGSM generates an adversarial example x′ by:
x′ = x +  · sign(∇xJ(w,x, y)) (2)
where x and y are the legitimate input and its true label
respectively,  is a constant value which can be determined
by an optimization scheme, and J is the cost function for
the model parameter w obtained after completing the training
process. FGSM is a white-box attack which means that the
model parameter w should be accessible to fetch its gradient
information and generate the adversarial example x′. In other
words, by providing the trained model and the training dataset,
FGSM can generate adversarial examples x′ using Eq. 2,
which have unrecognizable differences to the legitimate input
x and x′ can perhaps make the model w to predict a wrong
label y′ 6= y with high confidence.
The iterative version of the FGSM attack is known as Basic
Iterative Method (BIM) [1] and its attack frequency is higher
than one. In fact, BIM’s optimization procedure can stop after
generating the first adversarial example (BIM-a) or continue
up to a pre-defined number of iterations (BIM-b). These two
attacks are actually the improved version of FGSM which
increases the attack rate to the cost of higher computational
complexity.
Carlini and Wagner [14] have proposed an optimization-
based attack known as CWA, which uses the similarity metric
di defined in Eq. 3.
di = ‖xi − x′i‖ (3)
where i is the sample index. CWA attempts to minimize di
as:
min
c
‖di‖+ c× g(x + di) s.t. x + di ∈ [0, 1]n (4)
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where c > 0 is a suitably chosen constant, g(d) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
f(d) = y′; and y′ is the wrong label for x. The intuition
behind Eq. 4 is similar to the dropout variational inference
introduced by Li et al. [15]. This attack is very similar to
the FGSM attack with two main differences: (i) it changes
the input xi using the tanh function; (ii) it uses a difference
between logits (the vector of non-normalized predictions that
a model generates) instead of optimizing a cost function for
regular cross-entropy. CWA is one of the strongest iterative
and targeted adversarial attacks and it can be very effective
in fooling CNNs, though costly as it might need too many
callbacks to x.
The adversarial attacks presented so far are designed for
DNNs. Since the approach proposed in this paper is based on
SVMs, we also present two adversarial attacks designed to
attack SVM models: Evasion attack (EA) and Label Flipping
attack (LFA). EA [16] and LFA [17]. The main difference
between these two attacks is that LFA contaminates the
training data by flipping the true labels of the samples, while
EA manipulates the sample distribution aiming to change the
true labels. In both cases, the decision boundary of the model
is shifted toward maximum loss for the test set. The general
intuition behind EA is to map an input x over a support
vector(s) by simply flipping its label. This flipping can be
toward the trained weight direction(s) of the SVM as given
by Eq. 5.
x′ = x−  wi‖wi‖ (5)
where x′ is the crafted adversarial example, wi is the weight
vector discriminating support vectors, and  is a small constant
value. The intuition behind these two attacks is the geometrical
definition of support vectors as given by Eq. 6.
minw s.t. yi(w
>xi − b) ≥ 1 i = 1, . . . , n (6)
where w is a vector normal to the hyperplane (w>x− b = 0),
b is a bias term, and y = {+1,−1} is the label. The position
of the support vectors can be depicted as shown in Fig. 1.
↑ w
w
x i
− b
≤ c
w
x i
− b
≥ c

Fig. 1: Simplified visualization of hard margin form of SVM
adversarial attack. The dotted arrow depicts the Eq. 5. Data-
points are represented in two colors: red (adversarial) and blue
(legitimate).
In other words, the SVM model will be fooled by moving
a datapoint perpendicularly toward the opposite direction of
its weight vector. This attack is generalizable to soft margin
SVM by simply optimizing the value of  in Eq. 7.
1
n
n∑
i=1
max(1− yi(w>x− b), 0) +  ‖w‖2 (7)
As long as the optimization of  is perpendicularly directed
toward the wi, the SVM model cannot distinguish an ad-
versarial from legitimate examples. This data contamination
in EA can be implemented by taking advantage of gradient
information and local search for achieving the best data
perturbation with a specific budget as introduced by Biggio
et al. [16]. The gradient information can be exploited for
different kernels. For an RBF kernel with variance σ2, we
have K(x,xi) = exp(−0.5 · σ−2 ‖x− xi‖2), and its gradient
can be computed by Eq. 8.
∇K(x,xi) = −σ−2 exp(−0.5 · σ−2 ‖x− xi‖2)(x− xi) (8)
Similarly, for a polynomial kernel of degree p, denoted as
K(x,xi)=(〈x,xi〉+c)p, its gradient can be computed by Eq. 9.
∇K(x,xi) = p(〈x,xi〉+ c)p−1xi (9)
Therefore, the adversarial example x′ can be computed by:
x′ = x− η∇f(x) (10)
where η is a small scalar (step size) and f denotes the learned
filters in the hypothesis space H for K(x,xi)=Φ(x)>Φ(xi)
and Φ is a mapping function from input to the feature space.
Unlike EA, LFA does not generate an adversarial example via
distorting the legitimate samples, but it contaminates the labels
of such samples. This should result in maximum loss in the
test set while it is expected to be minimum for the training set.
The LFA attack can be implemented by solving the following
optimization problem:
min
q,w,,b
γ
2n∑
i=1
qi(i − ξi) + 1
2
‖w‖2 (11)
subject to:
yi(w
>xi + b) ≥ 1− i i ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , 2n (12)
having the budget of:
2n∑
i=n+1
ciqi ≤ C (13)
where γ is a fixed positive parameter for quantifying the trade
off, qi∈{0, 1} is an indicator variable for controlling over
the legitimate (q=0) and contaminated example (q=1), and ci
and C denote the flipping cost of each example and the total
flipping cost, respectively, from adversary’s point of view. The
hinge loss function (L), defined in Eq. 14
L(y, f(x)) := max(0, 1− yfD(x)) (14)
This loss function has been also used for i on the contami-
nated dataset of D′ as:
i := max(0, 1− yifD′(xi)) (15)
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where D′ is the contaminated dataset which also includes the
original dataset D. Similarly, ξi refers to the hinge loss of the
classifier fD:
fD(x) := w
>x + b, w :=
n∑
i=1
αiΦ(xi). (16)
Herein, b is the bias term and α denotes the Mercer kernel
coefficient of the SVM.
A. Transferability of Adversarial Attacks
One of the main characteristics of adversarial attacks de-
scribed so far is that they are non-targeted toward a specific
label as they maximize the probability of any label other
than the true one. This is very tricky since it opens up the
opportunity of adversarial transferability to other data-driven
models. This means that adversarial examples maintain their
effectiveness against models different from those targeted by
the attack. For instance, the FGSM attack, which targets
CNNs, could completely fool a maxout network trained on
the MNIST dataset [13]. Goodfellow et al. [13] have shown
that the linear behavior of FGSM can be transferred to
other classifiers including SVMs even with radial basis kernel
function. This was a breakpoint of studying adversarial trans-
ferability for all classifiers, from logistic regression (simple) to
very-deep CNNs (complex). Recently, Sabour et al. [2] have
shown the great effectiveness of FGSM on fooling other deep
architectures with and without convolution layers.
A lot of effort has been made on improving transferability
of adversarial attacks. From expanding input patterns (data-
wise) [18] to developing ensemble models that produce more
misleading adversarial examples (model-wise) [19]. Therefore,
this is a real threat since adversarial attacks can be transferred
among almost all models, e.g. from CNN to SVM, logistic
regression and decision trees [20]. Besides that, models trained
for speech-to-text translation have also been successfully
fooled by crafted adversarial examples [4]. Empirically, ma-
chine learning models designed for audio applications, based
on either 1D or 2D representation are very vulnerable against
adversarial attacks and the current defense schemes, such as
those proposed by Das et al. [21], do not work appropriately.
B. Adversarial Attacks for Audio Signals
Adversarial attacks have been mainly studied in the domain
of computer vision to perturb images. It has been shown
that 2D CNNs are quite vulnerable against white-box and
black-box optimization-based attacks [13]. However, these
optimization-based attacks are usually very costly, and they
require too many callbacks to each legitimate example, pixel-
by-pixel. Generalizing these optimization-based attacks to
audio signals (1D) is not straightforward since the audio
signal is usually high-dimensional data, even considering a
single audio channel. For instance, five seconds of mid-quality
audio corresponds to an array of 110,250 points. Therefore,
computing a similarity measure such as the `2-norm between
legitimate and crafted examples as a part of an adversarial
optimization criterion is very challenging compared to 2D
arrays.
Alzantot et al. [22] and Du et al. [23] have proposed speech-
to-text adversarial attacks where the optimization process is re-
placed with heuristic algorithms like genetic algorithms [22] or
particle swarm optimization [23] to mitigate the considerable
cost of the optimization process. Basically, these greedy and
evolutionary algorithms introduce random noise to a legitimate
example which in turn increases the chance of having a dis-
similarity between legitimate and crafted adversarial examples.
However, this also paves the way for an easy detection of ad-
versarial examples by simple algorithms. On the other hand, in
the most effective adversarial attacks for images (e.g. FGSM,
BIM, CWA, etc.), adversarial perturbations are generated by
an optimization process that has two key constraints: (i) induce
a machine learning model to produce a wrong label; (ii) have a
visual similarity between legitimate and adversarial examples.
It is difficult to satisfy these constraints for adversarial audio
because it is very challenging and time-consuming optimizing
for these two constraints considering the high dimensionality
of audio signals. Moreover, in contrast with images, audio
signals are not convolved in rows and columns and this also
makes very difficult solving the optimization problem for
adversarial audio perturbations. These difficulties constitute
enough ground for introducing evolutionary algorithms to
randomly search for possible adversarial perturbations which
basically can only respect the first key constraint. The main
side effect of this approach is producing adversarial examples
that stay close to the manifold of legitimate samples that
can be easily detected by a tuned classifier or by a simple
adversarial detector such as downsampling or upsampling. In
this case, adversarial examples crafted by greedy algorithms
lie in the submanifolds close to the legitimate samples, which
is basically the same manifolds where noisy samples lie in.
Some adversarial attacks explicitly add noise to the audio
signals mainly by manipulating the frequency components
[24], [25]. Backdoor attack [24] is based on adding non-
linearity to an audio signal in frequency ranges inaudible to the
human auditory system (over 20 kHz). This non-linearity can
be captured by microphones but does not show recognizable
effects on human ends. Taking advantage of this type of
attack, perturbations can be computed in frequency domain
and then applied to an audio signal, which can fool a machine
learning model. Backdoor attack lacks in defining a general
optimization formulation for computing adversarial frequency
perturbations (the shadow signal) [24]. In other words, there
is no analytical way for computing the perturbation. The
potential perturbation value may change depending on the
audio signal and therefore it makes the computation of proper
shadow signals very cumbersome and time-consuming. More-
over, audio frequency manipulation, even if unrecognizable by
humans, can be easily detected if the perturbed audio signal
is converted to a 2D representation. For instance, adversarial
examples generated by the Backdoor attack can be easily
detected by a simple post-processing module which analyzes
their spectrograms. An ideal case for an adversarial audio
example is to be unrecognizable in both 1D and 2D repre-
sentations. Similarly, DolphinAttack [25] implements phase
domain manipulations to change the sample label toward other
than the legitimate one that is unrecognizable by the human
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auditory system.
The detectability of the adversarial examples generated by
Backdoor and DolphinAttack algorithms can be assessed by
computing the local intrinsic dimensionality score (LID) [26]
for their 2D representations. For such an aim, three groups of
inputs should be defined: normal, noisy and adversarial where
the latter is generated by both Backdoor and DolphinAttack
algorithms. Next, each sample can be divided into mini-
batches and the LID score can be computed for each mini-
batch of these three groups with respect to their corresponding
legitimate examples, by Eq. 17:
LID(x) = −
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
log
ri(x)
rk(x)
)−1
(17)
where x ∈ <n×m is a 2D array, ri(x) refers to the distance
between x and their nearest neighbors, rk(x) denotes the
maximum of the neighbor distances, and k is the number of
neighbouring samples. The LID scores of noisy and normal
samples should be appended into negative class; and the LID
scores of adversarial samples should be assigned to the positive
class. Finally, a logistic regression can be trained on these two
classes. The experiments carried out on 2D representations
of audio signals in Section V-A show that the adversarial
examples generated by Backdoor and DolphinAttack can
change the true label, although they cannot be categorized
as adversarial attacks because of two main reasons: (i) the
adversarial examples lie in the subspace of legitimate and
random noisy signals when they basically should lie into
different sub-regions; (ii) since there is not an analytical or an
optimization-based approach for computing small adversarial
perturbations for high-dimensional audio, the values of such
perturbations are actually generated manually or by greedy
algorithms and therefore, this highly increases the chance
of detecting the adversarial signal even by a simple defense
model.
As it has been discussed so far, there are many open
problems in crafting adversarial perturbations to raw audio
signals and there is no reliable adversarial attack to 1D signals.
This could also be interpreted as a good point if we disregard
the fact that audio can be converted to a 2D representation
(spectrogram) where strong adversarial attacks developed for
images (e.g. FGSM, BIM, etc.) are quite applicable for 2D au-
dio representations. This is a critical issue and poses a security
concern for machine learning models for audio, either shallow
(e.g. SVM) or deep learning models (e.g. CNNs). However,
addressing the transferability of adversarial examples from 1D
audio signals to 2D audio representations (or vice versa) is
out of the scope of this paper. In fact, one of our goals in this
paper is to assess the resiliency of machine learning models
based on different types of 2D audio representations to some
strong adversarial attacks aiming to better understand their
vulnerabilities.
III. 2D AUDIO REPRESENTATION
The vulnerability of machine learning models such as CNNs
and long short-term memory networks on audio waveforms
has been studied by Carlini and Wagner [4]. They have
shown the weaknesses of these models against FGSM-like
adversarial attacks. However, the state-of-the-art for several
audio tasks, such as music genre classification [27], [28],
speaker identification [29], environmental sound classification
[29], etc. are based on 2D representation. This aroused our
interest to evaluate the robustness of models based on 2D
representations against adversarial attacks. To the best of our
knowledge, the resiliency of 2D CNNs such as AlexNet and
GoogLeNet, which have achieved the highest performances on
environmental sound datasets, against adversarial attacks has
not been studied in 2D representation spaces. To such an aim,
we use Fourier and wavelet transforms to convert raw audio
signals into 2D representations. The first transformation is
used to produce short-time frequency spectrograms for training
AlexNet and GoogLeNet [11]. We also use wavelet transform
for producing more informative spectrograms, which after
some pre-processing steps are used in the proposed approach
to train an SVM classifier. A brief description of these two
types of spectrogram is presented as follows.
Considering a discrete-time audio signal a[n], where n =
0, 1, . . . , N−1 denotes the number of samples and its decom-
posed signal S using Fourier (time-frequency) transform using
{gτ,%}τ,% atoms, as:
S[τ, %] = 〈a, gτ,%〉 =
N−1∑
n=0
a[n]g∗τ,%[n] (18)
where the operator ∗ denotes the complex conjugate, and τ, %
are time and frequency localization indices, respectively. This
representation is widely used in sound and speech processing
[30], [31]. Given a Hanning window H[n] of size ϑ which is
shifted by a step u ≤ ϑ, then {gτ,%}τ,% in the latter equation
can be defined as [32]:
gτ,%[n] = H[n− τu] exp
(
j2pi%n
ϑ
)
(19)
where 0 ≤ τ ≤ N/u and 0 ≤ % ≤ ϑ denote bindings of time
and frequency (scale) indices respectively. Finally, the Fourier
spectrogram is represented as:
spSTFT[τ, %] = log |S[τ, %]| (20)
The final appearance of a spectrogram depends on the pa-
rameters τ and %. Similar to this transform is the continuous
wavelet transform (CWT ) as denoted in Eq. 21:
CWT (f, z; a(t), ψ(t)) =
1√
f
∫ +∞
−∞
a(t)ψ(
t− z
f
)dt (21)
where ψ(t) denotes the mother wavelet and f, z, and t stand
for scale, translation and time, respectively. The discretized
representation of CWT is given by Eq. 22, and it is deter-
mined on a grid of f scales and n discrete time with dilation
parameter ρ.
DWT (f, n) = 2f/2
n−1∑
ρ=0
a(ρ)ψ(2f, ρ− n) (22)
For ψ, we use Morlet function where f is set to 0.8431:
ψ(t) = e−(f
2t2)/2 cos(jpit) (23)
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Finally, the wavelet spectrogram can be obtained as:
spDWT[f, z] = |DWT (f, z)|2 (24)
In summary, for an audio signal a[n], there will be two
different 2D representations: spSTFT and spDWT. Moreover,
for the latter spectrogram we use three scales for the mag-
nitude, which provide different visualization schemes: linear,
logarithmic, and logarithmic real. Linear scale highlights high-
frequency magnitudes which represent high variation areas
in the spectrogram. Logarithm scale highlights low-frequency
information which expands distance of magnitudes in different
scales. Finally, logarithm real scale highlights the energy of the
signal which is related to the signals mean.
IV. A ROBUST APPROACH FOR 2D AUDIO
REPRESENTATION AND CLASSIFICATION
In general, the current approaches for audio classification
are able to achieve high accuracy but they are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks, what means that they can be easily fooled
by adversarial examples. Therefore, our aim is to design a
novel approach for audio classification that provides a good
tradeoff between classification accuracy and low vulnerability
to some of the most threatening adversarial attacks. The
proposed approach for environmental sound classification has
three main parts: spectrogram preprocessing, feature extrac-
tion, and classification. Fig. 2 presents an overview of the
proposed preprocessing approach which, given an audio signal
produces three spectrogram representations as output. The
audio signal undergoes through color compensation, highboost
filtering, dimensionality reduction, and smoothing and at the
end, we have three enhanced spectrograms. Next, speeded
up robust features (SURF) are extracted from zoning blocks
that slide over the spectrograms as shown in Fig. 3. The
geometrical distance of feature vectors is maximized by a K-
means++ algorithm and finally a multiclass SVM trained on
such features makes the prediction.
A. Spectrogram Preprocessing
The goal of the spectrogram preprocessing is threefold: (i)
improve the accuracy of the front-end classifier; (ii) improve
the robustness of the trained model against adversarial attacks;
(iii) artificially increase the number of samples of the dataset.
It starts by color compensation of the spectrogram spDWT
by mapping each spectrogram to three different color spaces:
black-blue-green (BBG), purple-gold (PG), and white-black
(WB) as shown in Fig. 4. Empirically, color compensation
boosts and improves the final classification performance be-
cause it affects pixel intensity values, though keeping their
distributions. The second preprocessing operation is highboost
filtering [33], which enhances color compensated spectrograms
focusing on their high-frequency elements while maintaining
low-frequency components. The output of the filter is denoted
as spENH which is given by Eq. 25.
spENH = (Fap + cFhf )× spDWT (25)
where Fhf represents a high-pass filter (5×5 Laplacian oper-
ator) which is multiplied by a constant value c which acts as
a scaling factor, and Fap denotes an all-pass filter.
The three spectrogram representations and color compensa-
tions increase in nine times the number of samples into the
datasets in addition to the pitch-shifting augmentation that is
also applied, but on the 1D signal prior to the spectrogram
representation. Pitch-shifting increases by eight times the
number of samples. Therefore, to alleviate the computational
complexity both in computing and storage, we reduce the
dimensionality of the spectrograms. Though, there are many
algorithms for such an aim, we use singular value decompo-
sition (SVD) because of its pivotal properties in reducing the
dimensionality of 2D data without changing the perceived vi-
sual appearance, if the reduction rank is chosen appropriately.
Somewhat similar to the Fourier transform, SVD can describe
a 2D matrix by basis functions in such a way that, linear
combination of these functions can reconstruct the original
spectrogram [34]. Basis functions in Fourier transform are sine
and cosine, but SVD produces individual basis matrices for
each given input. For an enhanced spectrogram spENH, SVD
decomposes it as:
spENH =
m′∑
i=1
GiUiV
>
i (26)
where G, U , and V are derived matrices from decomposing
spENH into singular value, hanger, and aligner matrices, re-
spectively. Also m′ is the minimum dimension of the spec-
trogram either in width or height. The matrix G is a diagonal
and its elements are in descending order which indicates the
importance of hanger and aligner column vectors. The basis
functions associated with spENH are the product of Ui and
V >i weighted by Gi. This allows us to reconstruct spENH by
its most important components, from low to high frequency
components. By setting the m′ in Eq. 26 to m′/n′ where n′>1,
we can make a balance between dimensionality reduction and
quality of reconstruction. This operation actually acts as prin-
cipal component analysis [35]. Empirically, the magnitudes of
G will be less than the pixel precision (1/255 for an 8-bit rep-
resentation) at indices around n′=2 and therefore they can be
pruned without any visual impact on the spectrograms. Though
this dimension reduction resizes spectrogram dimension to
half, the quality of the reconstructed image is quite good,
and differences are imperceptible to the human visual system
(see Fig. 5). The outputs of the dimensionality reduction
block in Fig. 2 are linear, logarithmic, and logarithmic real
spectrograms visualized in three color spaces (BBG, PG, and
WB) which are all reduced to half of their original dimension.
Though highboost filtering enhances high frequency compo-
nents in spectrograms and therefore it leads to a better feature
extraction, it may also boost noise, especially for the PG and
WB color compensated representations. This problem can be
minimized to some extent by the dimensionality reduction by
SVD, but it is still necessary to improve the quality of the final
compensated representations of spectrograms. For addressing
this issue, highboost filtered spectrograms are smoothed using
a denoising autoencoder with three convolution layers [36].
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Fig. 2: Overview of spectrogram generation and preprocessing. From a single audio waveform, three spectrogram representations
are generated and processed through several blocks with the aim of enhancing the 2D representation.
Fig. 3: Overview of the proposed classification approach. Values in the first block indicate sizes of square zones (blocks) from
16×16 to 128×128. Stride values in the second block correspond to the zone sizes in the first block. For instance, a 96×96
block has stride 2, and so on.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 4: Spectrogram examples: (a) original; (b) black-blue-
green (BBG); (c) purple-gold (PG); (d) white-black (WB).
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 5: Dimension reduction effect: (a) linear magnitude repre-
sentation; (b) reconstruction of (a) after reduction in half; (c)
logarithmic magnitude representation; (d) reconstruction of (c)
after reduction in half.
The main advantage of convolutional denoising autoencoder
(CDA) over traditional smoothing algorithms is its flexibility
in data adaptation and fine reconstruction. Besides, another
important reason for using the CDA is to make spectrograms
more robust against small adversarial perturbations which
machine learning models are very sensitive to. The architecture
of the proposed CDA depicted in Fig. 6 is data-dependent
and it considers spectrograms of dimension 1167×765 as
input. The architecture of the encoder shown in Fig. 6 has
three convolutional layers with 5×5 receptive fields, stride 1,
Relu activation function, dropout of 0.5, and two max pooling
layers. For corrupting the input data, we used the spectrograms
derived from SVD as well as the technique introduced by
Vincent et al. [37].
Finally, after all these preprocessing steps, the enhanced
spectrograms are ready to undergo to feature extraction and
classification, as described in the following subsection. Besides
that, the enhanced spectrograms can also be used with pre-
trained CNN architectures such as AlexNet or GoogLeNet, as
described in Section V.
B. Feature Extraction and Classification
The proposed approach includes five steps for feature ex-
traction and classification as depicted in Fig. 3. The main idea
is to extract features from a static sized moving aperture (a.k.a.
grid shifting block) which spans a spectrogram with a dynamic
stride within a block with dynamic size. Next, we maximize
the geometrical distance among feature vectors of different
classes and finally we train an SVM classifier on such an
organized feature space. Since the proposed approach aims of
achieving both classification accuracy and robustness against
adversarial attacks, we have evaluated several handcrafted
features and representation learning methods to finally come
up with SURF instead of CNN features. Empirically, such
a feature encoding outperforms DNN features (with/without
convolution layers) both in terms of classification accuracy and
robustness against adversarial attacks. Our main hypothesis
relies on the nature of these features which are projected
gradients compared to features generated by DNNs, which
generally lead to high classification accuracy but empirically,
they have a negative effect on the robustness of the trained
model, which becomes quite vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
The first step is zoning, which divides a given spectro-
gram into zones that may vary from 16×16 to 128×128
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Fig. 6: Architecture of the proposed CDA to smooth the spec-
trogram representations. Numbers inside parentheses denote
the number of filters, and width and height of inputs and
outputs, respectively.
pixels. Empirically, a zone size of 16×16 is small enough
for capturing subtle pixel density changes and a zone size
of 128×128 is preferable for regions with less high frequency
components. Then, a sliding grid of size 8×8 will span through
them. The stride of the sliding grid varies from five to one
according to the zone size, with larger strides on larger zones.
This scheme supports the idea of a detailed scanning of
spectrograms aiming at extracting more discriminant features.
Different values have been evaluated for the stride size and
finally it ranges from one to five (see Fig. 7).
Different features could be extracted from each 8×8 grid.
We also evaluated scale invariant feature transform (SIFT)
as a feature extractor [38] but decided to use SURF [39]
because it is much faster than SIFT in runtime, even if it
provides fewer feature vectors compared to SIFT. We applied
SURF on sliding grids within each zone as shown in Fig. 3,
and at the end, each spectrogram zone is represented by a
64-dimensional feature vector. For increasing the inter-class
geometrical distance among extracted feature vectors, the K-
m×m
Zone
8×8
Sliding Grid
...
...
...
1×64 feature vector
Fig. 7: Example of a grid sliding over a spectrogram. The grid
slides through the square zone with different strides.
means++ algorithm [40] is used to cluster feature vectors into
an organized distribution with respect to their geometrical
linear distance. Once centroids are found by the clustering
algorithm all feature vectors will be mapped into a distance
space according to their centroids. We refer readers to [41] for
further details. Finally, we train a multiclass SVM classifier
with polynomial kernel on the transformed feature vectors. We
have also evaluated the SVM with radial basis function (RBF)
kernel which could not improve the accuracy. In the following
section we evaluate the proposed approach on three datasets
and compare the results with other state-of-the-art approaches.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have carried out several experiments on three bench-
marking datasets with the aim of: (i) evaluating the de-
tectability of the current adversarial attacks for 2D audio
representations; (ii) assessing the performance of the proposed
approach on the enhanced spectrograms and compare it with
deep architectures (AlexNet and GoogLeNet) that have been
used for audio classification; (iii) evaluating the resiliency
of the proposed approach and the two deep architectures
against several types of adversarial attacks; (iv) characterizing
the transferability of the adversarial audio attacks across two
different classification paradigms, CNNs and SVMs.
The UrbanSound8K dataset has 8,732 audio samples of
up to four seconds of 10 classes (air conditioner, car horn,
children playing, dog bark, drilling, engine idling, gun shot,
jackhammer, siren, and street music). The ESC-50 dataset
includes 2,000 5-second samples of 50 classes including major
groups of animals, natural sound capes & water sounds, human
non-speech sounds, domestic sounds, and exterior noises. The
ESC-10 dataset is a subset of ESC-50 which includes 400
recordings of 10 classes (dog bark, rain, sea waves, baby cry,
clock tick, person sneeze, helicopter, chainsaw, rooster, and
fire crackling).
A. Detectability of Adversarial Audio Attacks
The definition of an adversarial attack relies on whether the
attack is easily identified or not. We have carried out some
experiments to evaluate two of the most powerful adversarial
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attacks on audio: Backdoor and the DolphinAttack. For such
an aim, we generated short-time Fourier transform (STFT),
DWT, and cross recurrence plot (CRP) spectrograms for the
audio samples of the UrbanSound8K dataset and computed
the LID score considering different values of k as shown in
Eq. 17. Basically, the LID score should be able to discriminate
between negative and positive classes which means returning
higher values. In other words, small values of the LID score
denote an indistinguishable difference between positive and
negative classes which can in turn be interpreted as posi-
tive classes may not be considered as adversarial. Table I
shows that the differences between LID scores of positive
and negative classes are quite small and it also shows the
very low accuracy of the logistic regression classifier trained
on these classes. As Table I shows, legitimate, noisy, and
adversarial examples lie in the same subspace and in fact they
lie in the same manifolds because they have very similar LID
scores. In other words, the adversarial examples generated by
both Backdoor and DolphinAttack are almost equivalent to
examples corrupted by random noise, which basically does
not seem to satisfy the definition of adversarial examples.
Moreover, the performance of the logistic regression is quite
low and shows poor discrimination between negative and
positive classes which should be higher than 60%.
TABLE I: LID score for different representations of Ur-
banSound8K samples. Mean difference is generated for two
classes of negative (legitimate and random noisy) and positive
(adversarial by Backdoor and DolphinAttack).
Representation k Mean Difference Classification
of LID Scores Accuracy (%)
DWT
50 0.082 11.23
75 0.071 10.04
100 0.036 10.01
125 0.032 09.46
STFT
50 0.076 13.05
75 0.074 12.94
100 0.066 12.92
125 0.061 11.87
CRP
50 0.089 15.01
75 0.084 14.56
100 0.079 14.32
125 0.078 13.77
B. Accuracy and Resilience of CNNs and SVMs
Deep neural networks require a large amount of data for
training. For increasing the size of datasets aiming at extracting
more information from them, we augmented the number of
samples by stretching (speeding up) and shrinking (slowing
down) recordings in time (pitch shifting) using MUDA library
[42]. This is a common approach in sound processing which
affects favourably the classifier’s performance [9]. The scale
values that were applied for pitch-shifting are: 0.5, 0.75, 0.9,
1.1, 1.25, 1.5, and 1.75. This operation increases the size of
each dataset in eight times.
For generating the spectrogram spSTFT, we used the ap-
proach suggested by Boddapati et al. [11] by setting sampling
frequency to 8 kHz, 16 kHz, and 8 kHz for ESC-10, ESC-
50, and UrbanSound8K datasets, respectively. Also, the frame
TABLE II: Scale operators (c) for color compensation.
Dataset Color Compensation c
ESC-10
BBG 0.57
PG 0.74
WB 0.46
ESC-50
BBG 0.81
PG 0.79
WB 0.58
UrbS8K
BBG 0.72
PG 0.85
WB 0.67
length was set to 50 ms (ESC-10), 30 ms (ESC-50), and 50 ms
(UrbanSound8K) with a fixed overlapping of 50%. These val-
ues have been found after conducting exploratory experiments
on these datasets. For generating the spectrogram spDWT, we
used 256 frequency bins with a Morlet mother function as
proposed by Cowling and Sitte [43] and linear, logarithmic,
and logarithmic real magnitude scales for enhancing high, low
and medium frequencies, respectively. The scale operators c
as described in Eq. 25, are shown in Table II. The SVM uses
a quadratic kernel with the cost parameter ‖c‖ ≤ 0.1 and the
kernel parameter ‖γ‖ < 0.003. Besides the quadratic kernel,
we also evaluated a linear SVM, which is referred simply as
SVM in several tables in this section. We have used the scikit-
learn [44] package for implementing SVMs.
In the first experiment, we trained AlexNet and GoogLeNet
with the same setup proposed by Boddapati et al. [11] which
leads to the highest classification performance reported in the
literature for 2D representations. These two deep convolutional
neural networks were trained on a linear pooling of STFT
(spSTFT), MFCC (spMFCC), and CRP (spCRP) spectrograms,
as:
spPOOL = clip
(
spSTFT + spMFCC + spCRP, [0, 1]
)
(27)
where spPOOL denotes the resulting pooled spectrogram which
values outside the range [0,1] are clipped to the value at
the boundary of the range. These spectrograms are computed
for the three environmental sound datasets (ESC-10, ESC-
50, and UrbanSound8K) after the augmentation procedure. In
addition to training our classifier on the pooled representation,
referred to as POOL, we also trained it on the enhanced 2D
representation space as shown in Fig. 2, referred to as DWT.
These two representations are also evaluated for AlexNet and
GoogLeNet. In other words, we evaluate the performance of
AlexNet and GoogLeNet on the spectrograms obtained from
our data preprocessing approach. These two experiments are
executed using 5-fold cross validation with a ratio of 0.2
for testing. We used four parallel GPUs GTX580 based on
an implementation based on [45]. We stopped training after
83 epochs using early stopping for AlexNet and GoogLeNet.
The results achieved by these two classifiers are reported in
Table III. As Table III shows, AlexNet and GoogLeNet have
achieved the best performances for both representation spaces,
although the proposed approach presents competitive results.
The differences between the best deep model and the proposed
approach range from 4.32% for UrbanSound8K to 11.02% for
ESC-50. We also repeated this experiment with 10-fold cross
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validation as suggested in [9], but the results were very close
to those reported in Table III.
TABLE III: Mean classification accuracy (5-fold CV) of four
classifiers on two representation spaces: POOL and DWT. The
best performances are shown in bold.
Dataset Repres. Mean Accuracy (%)
GoogLeNet AlexNet SVM Proposed
ESC-10 POOL 83.19 82.54 64.23 78.31
DWT 83.21 82.90 70.45 79.10
ESC-50 POOL 71.36 64.09 52.37 60.10
DWT 71.20 66.41 55.09 60.41
UrbS8K POOL 91.08 90.06 72.03 86.15
DWT 86.85 90.10 72.89 86.39
However, a high accuracy does not translate to a high
robustness against adversarial attacks. In Table IV, we assess
the robustness of the classifiers of Table III against several
adversarial attacks as well as the transferability of such adver-
sarial attacks across different models. For such an aim we have
developed the FGSM, BIM-a, BIM-b, and CWA adversarial
attacks (deep model attacks) for AlexNet and GoogLeNet and
the EA and regular Evasion attacks (SVM attacks) for SVM
classifiers. The total number of adversarial examples crafted
using each attack for different datasets is equivalent to the
number of samples in the legitimate dataset. In other words,
for each legitimate sample, one adversarial example is crafted
by each adversarial attack algorithm. Since FGSM and CWA
are targeted, adversarial examples of these two attacks are
crafted toward a random wrong label. This not only makes our
evaluations fair against non-targeted attacks, but also reduces
the cost of crafting adversarial examples of datasets with more
than 10 classes, which is the case of the ESC-50 dataset
that has 50 classes. Then, these crafted examples are fed to
both deep learning and SVM models to compute the ratio
of successful fooling over the total number of adversarial
examples (fooling rate) in a black-box scenario.
Table IV also shows the transferability of adversarial attacks
crafted to attack deep models to attack SVM models and
vice-versa. A high adversarial transferability rate represents
a serious threat for data-driven classifiers. In other words, a
reliable classifier should not only be robust against adversar-
ial attacks designed to fool its own type of model, but it
should also be reasonably resistant against attacks designed
to attack other types of model. Table IV shows the results
achieved on both experiments. The mean fooling rate, which
measures the success rate of adversarial examples in fooling
the machine learning models in terms of the percentage of
adversarial samples misclassified by the models is computed
for comparing the performance of CNNs and SVMs against
the six adversarial attacks. Table IV shows that both for both
CNNs and SVMs are quite vulnerable to the adversarial attacks
designed to attack its own model, with fooling rates higher
than 90%. However, the proposed approach not only is quite
robust, but also has the lowest fooling rate against adversarial
attacks (EA and LFA) designed for such a model, with fooling
rates between 58.15% and 71.64%. Table IV also reveals
that, there is a higher chance of fooling SVM models by
deep attacks compared to fooling AlexNet and GoogLeNet
TABLE IV: Mean fooling rate (5-fold CV) of two CNNs and
two SVMs against six strong adversarial attacks. The best
performances are shown in bold (lowest values).
Dataset Adv. Mean Fooling Rate (%)
(Repres.) Attack GoogLeNet AlexNet SVM Proposed
ESC-10
(POOL)
FGSM 95.23 94.04 60.78 43.12
BIM-a 94.07 90.13 61.68 48.60
BIM-b 94.26 91.30 62.46 46.03
CWA 95.89 93.66 94.01 51.77
LFA 51.23 63.01 94.43 60.47
EA 43.79 44.12 94.14 58.34
ESC-10
(DWT)
FGSM 94.30 93.36 64.05 50.02
BIM-a 92.15 92.87 59.57 51.13
BIM-b 93.58 92.33 57.92 43.07
CWA 95.36 94.89 64.35 53.18
LFA 57.36 56.35 95.58 71.64
EA 49.66 48.00 92.89 61.78
ESC-50
(POOL)
FGSM 96.78 95.61 69.22 51.99
BIM-a 95.01 96.08 67.17 50.20
BIM-b 94.77 95.17 69.71 50.03
CWA 96.02 97.14 72.10 53.04
LFA 62.12 66.35 95.27 60.25
EA 55.47 52.01 95.94 59.03
ESC-50
(DWT)
FGSM 96.30 95.80 66.16 50.01
BIM-a 93.36 94.05 69.02 49.36
BIM-b 91.25 92.53 67.11 45.92
CWA 95.73 94.11 70.09 49.31
LFA 60.08 58.01 92.21 62.84
EA 51.37 49.61 90.36 58.15
UrbS8K
(POOL)
FGSM 94.68 93.22 60.50 45.17
BIM-a 94.65 95.32 58.22 42.36
BIM-b 90.22 91.24 53.39 42.16
CWA 92.08 93.62 60.17 60.25
LFA 55.01 78.36 96.14 65.35
EA 44.02 41.07 95.16 62.30
UrbS8K
(DWT)
FGSM 94.14 93.02 57.31 48.33
BIM-a 92.43 93.21 62.01 51.07
BIM-b 94.01 93.61 63.32 53.03
CWA 95.27 93.84 62.14 50.48
LFA 54.33 55.03 92.06 63.52
EA 47.01 45.50 91.02 59.01
by adversarial examples crafted by EA or LFA. Additionally,
AlexNet is more robust against SVM-based adversarial attacks
compared to GoogLeNet, though its mean accuracy is a little
lower than GoogLeNet.
TABLE V: Average ranking considering the mean accuracy
and the fooling rate for all models, datasets and adversarial
attacks.
Approach Mean Accuracy Fooling Rate
r¯ Rank r¯ Rank
GoogLeNet 1.17 1 2.97 4
AlexNet 1.83 2 2.78 3
SVM 4.00 4 2.67 2
Proposed 3.00 3 1.61 1
Table V shows average rankings of our evaluation metrics
of recognition accuracy and fooling rate with respect to the
statistics provided in Table IV. Regarding this table, the
smaller the r¯ is, the better are the accuracy and the fooling
rates. Although the proposed approach appears in third place
in the mean accuracy rank, it is the first one in resiliency
against the six types of adversarial attacks. Therefore, this
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Fig. 8: Comparison between deep models, SVM, and the
proposed approach over all datasets and representations of
Table III. The Euclidean distance to the origin for the two
best approaches is also shown.
indicates a good tradeoff between accuracy and resiliency.
This is also shown in Fig. 8, where the proposed approach is
the one closest to the origin (zero error rate and zero fooling
rate) according to the Euclidean distance (d = 58.91). Fig. 8
also shows that while the mean error rate of the proposed
approach is 6.07% higher than GoogLeNet, the proposed
approach is 26.96% more robust to adversarial attacks than
GoogLeNet. Furthermore, the mean error rate of the proposed
approach is 10.57% lower than the SVM and it is also 20.98%
more robust to adversarial attacks. Notwithstanding the good
tradeoff achieved by the proposed approach, there is still a
large room for improvements.
C. Analysis of the Proposed Approach
The proposed approach provides the best tradeoff between
accuracy and resilience to adversarial attacks than deep models
and SVM according to the proposed metric shown in Fig. 8.
For understanding the reason(s) of such a best tradeoff, we dig
into the preprocessing (Fig. 2) of the proposed approach. We
safely remove each module (or submodule) from the prepro-
cessing part and measure its positive or negative contribution
to the mean accuracy and robustness against the six types
of adversarial attacks. Table VI reveals that the proposed
approach takes advantage of both CDA and SVD compression.
The most straightforward impact of these two operations is
in affecting (smoothing) high frequency components where
subtle changes of adversarial examples probably lie on. It has
been proved that autoencoders can clean adversarial examples
and therefore defend the targeted trained models from the
adversarial attacks [46], [47]. Moreover, for measuring the
effect of the first two modules of Fig. 3 on final classification
performance, we carried out some additional experiments
including removing them and changing block size and grid
shifting stride on a 5-fold cross validation. In Table VII, we
only report some of the highest mean accuracy with respect
to zoning size and grid shifting stride.
TABLE VI: The average effect of removing each module from
Fig. 2 on the mean accuracy and robustness of the proposed
model against deep and SVM adversarial attacks. Positive (+)
and negative (−) effects are shown by their signs.
Module
Mean Robustness Against (%)
Accuracy (%) SVM Attacks Deep Attacks
Spectr. Vis. −16.47 −4.07 −3.14
Color Comp. −7.36 −0.36 +2.64
Highb. Filt. −9.52 −0.75 −1.96
SVD −8.21 −6.18 −4.17
CDA −7.94 −9.18 −6.33
TABLE VII: The effect of selected zoning size and shifting
grid length on the overall recognition accuracy of the pro-
posed approach on DWT representation of the UrbanSound8K
dataset.
Zoning Size Sliding Grid Stride Mean Accuracy (%)
[16, 32, 64, 96, 128] [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] 79.33
[16, 32, 64, 96, 128] [2, 2, 2, 2, 2] 77.29
[8, 16, 32, 64, 128] [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] 76.18
[16, 32, 64, 96, 128] [4, 3, 3, 3, 4] 74.22
[32, 64, 128] [3, 2, 1] 73.91
[64, 96, 128] [3, 2, 1] 72.63
None None 70.92
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed the serious threat that adversarial
attacks may pose to machine learning models trained either
on 1D or 2D audio representations. While there is no reliable
adversarial attack on raw audio signals, there is a bijective
relation between 1D signals and spectrograms which opens
the avenue for adversarial transferability between these two
representation spaces and that poses a real security concern.
Besides that, considering that the majority of state-of-the-art
approaches for audio classification rely on 2D representations,
most of them based on CNNs originally designed for image
classification tasks, we showed that CNNs trained on spectro-
grams of environmental sound signals achieve state-of-the-art
performance in terms of accuracy. However, these CNNs are
not reliable at all, as they can be easily fooled by adversarial
examples, with fooling rates higher than 90%.
Therefore, we proposed a novel approach for environmental
sound classification based on 2D representations that provides
a good tradeoff between accuracy and resiliency to the most
powerful adversarial attacks designed to fool both deep neural
models and SVMs. The proposed approach was compared
to AlexNet, GoogLeNet, and a linear SVM classifier on
three publicly available datasets. The highest mean recogni-
tion rates were achieved by GoogLeNet (81.15%), AlexNet
(79.15%), the proposed approach (75.08%), and the linear
SVM (64.51%), respectively. However, in addition to the
competitive accuracy, the proposed approach outperforms by
far all three mentioned classifiers in terms of robustness against
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adversarial attacks since the mean fooling rates for these four
models are 95.15%, 94.36%, 50.56%, and 66.74% consider-
ing deep attacks and 52.62%, 54.79%, 61.89%, and 93.77%
considering SVM attacks. However, as shown in Fig. 8, there
is still a large room for improvements. As a future study,
we are interested in employing reactive adversarial detection
algorithms (e.g., LID detector) as a postprocessing operation
aiming at increasing the robustness of the proposed approach.
We are also inclined to explore the resiliency of our classifi-
cation scheme for raw audio signals rather than spectrograms
against audio attacks and measure its capability against audio
played back over the air. To this end, we may need to re-
move/add some preprocessing steps which have shown positive
impacts on the robustness of the proposed approach against
adversarial attacks (e.g. CDA); and consequently, simplify our
approach which requires several steps of processing. Another
important aspect that deserves further studies is the adversarial
example transferability bijectively from 1D audio signal to
2D spectrograms and vice versa. In other words, we would
like to explore the possibility of crafting adversarial audio
examples for a model trained on 1D signals and transfer
such an attack to the 2D representation to be able to fool
a 2D model trained on spectrograms, and also the other way
around. Since many audio classification approaches implement
different types (ensemble) of data-driven models (both 1D
and 2D) aiming at improving their prediction confidence,
hence if a crafted adversarial example can fool both 1D
and 2D models, it may constitute a true threat to several
sound recognition/processing systems and devices (e.g. voice
id devices).
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